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Abstract. We frequently work with the events´ description besides other 
assessments in safety/risk assessment. In pure technical applications these events 
are related with the failure occurrence of equipment, a device, a system or an item. 
This contribution can be a complex problem for the term “failure” and its related 
characteristics. In this paper there are mentioned functions of an object and their 
description, classification of failures, main characteristics of failure, possible 
causes of failure, mechanisms of failure and consequences of failure and also other 
contributions related with failure very closely.  
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CONTRIBUTION TO FAILURE DESCRIPTION AS THE 
PHENOMENA  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Before we introduce the topic of a failure let us ask a simple question. Why 
do things actually break? Answers can vary. One of the answers might be 
the following statement which we are going to develop more. Usually the 
reason for this is that the applied load exceeds the dimension/robustness of 
the product. The load can be purely mechanical (force, tension, etc.), purely 
electrical (power, electromagnetic field, etc.), purely chemical (effect of 
chemical substances, etc.), general physical (warmth, radiation, etc.), or of a 
totally different nature. Whenever the applied load exceeds the assumed 
dimension of the item, unwanted (usually irreversible) processes start, and 
sooner or later a failure occurs. The load can be a one time load or it can be 
applied a number of times. Concerning the first instance, overload failure 
will occur and in the second case fatigue failure will occur. As time passes, 
the product could become weaker for any one of many reasons (unless a 
failure occurs immediately). One of the basic assumptions dealing with a 
failure is as follows. Before any failure incurred due to inner cause (e.g. 
operation or using an item) occurs, it is essential to have a device in 
operation. Idleness of an item or a system can end in a failure due to natural 
ageing, but in this case the initial mechanism is not properly understood. A 
relevant failure occurs mostly only during operation. 
 
Some factors and characteristics for describing failures: 
 
Process in time of occurrence and manifestation: 
- failure causes; 
- failure manifestations (ways/mechanisms); 
- failure consequence  
 
Failure causes: 
o design failures; 
o manufacturing failures; 
o overstress failures; 
o misuse failures; 
o degradation failures; 
 
Failure profile 
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Failure manifestations: 
o random failures; 
o gradual; 
o sudden; 
o common caused failures; 
o primary and secondary failures; 
o intrinsic failures; 
o extrinsic failures; 
 
Failure consequences: 
o insignificant; 
o marginal; 
o minor; 
o major; 
o critical; 
o catastrophic; 
 
Failure is a term widely used in technical practice especially concerning 
dependability theory. For the reliability practitioners failure is a basic term 
in dependability theory, and it is key and essential for observing stochastic 
relations of item behavior. It is an event which is used by probability 
theories on a general level, for they speak about a probability event. In 
dependability theory it is necessary to realize the fact of failure as a 
stochastic term, to understand its meaning, and to understand other links. 
And only because of this, mathematical tools, used in dependability, are not 
only a dead and boring “set” of formulas, relations and graphical 
expressions. 
 
While observing a technical item we concentrate basically on possible 
causes of failures, their development over time, their process, mechanism, 
and of course their impact, effect, or other influences which might result 
from a failure occurrence. It is inevitable to realize that a failure is of key 
importance for operation and function of technical items. Theory and 
practice in particular shows us that failures occur under different situations, 
various circumstances, different conditions, etc. Theoretically, dealing with 
failures, we can describe their possible causes, nature of occurrence, process 
of development, and we are able to model them at the same time. We can 
see connections between individual groups of failures and their profiles. We 
can match a range of importance and numerical values with the failures, 
they can fall into groups, sets, etc. However, our biggest, continual effort is 
to eliminate failure occurrence, reduce its number (frequency), limit the 
number of its occurrences over a specified time period or in relation to 
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another observed dependent quantity (mileage, cycles, etc.). Our intention is 
to be able to determine their occurrence so exactly that we could be 
prepared to face it as well as possible. Simply our aim is to get a better 
profile of an observed item from the view of its dependability and related 
properties. 
 
Furthermore, we would like to describe possible classes of failures, their 
profiles, courses, development, consequences, and other relations which 
might be important for dependability theory and especially for this paper 
itself. The phenomena involved in this article are definitely not an example 
of a complete and synoptic list of all known and possible events assisting a 
failure. The aim of this article is to introduce the topic which is usually 
believed to be obvious, familiar and clear. However, reality need not match 
our ideas or the ideas of other people in full. The purpose of the paper is 
also to initiate the reader into the topic of a failure and at the same time to 
popularize it. Without full understanding we would not like the reader to 
absorb a piece of scripted information and not to obtain its complex form. A 
frequently used term might have a totally different meaning then. It would 
be great while working on it and finding it in a book, using theoretical tools, 
profiles, graphs, models, and other descriptions and contexts, we would be 
able to imagine there is definitely something more to the term [1, 2, 3, 4]. 
 
2. Current terminology situation 
 
The following part speaks just briefly about the current terminology 
situation which is caused by the ISO/IEC representatives and national 
bodies. Failure according to the present version of the IEC 60050 (191) is 
defined as follows: “termination of the ability of an item to perform a 
required function”. 
 
Note 1. After failure the item has a fault. 
Note 2. Failure is an event, as distinguished from fault, which is a state. 
Note 3. This concept as defined does not apply to items consisting of 
software only. 
 
Failure according to the newly upgraded version IEC 60050 (191) is defined 
as follows: “loss of ability to perform as required” 
 
Note 1: When the loss of ability is caused by a pre-existing condition, the 
failure occurs when a particular set of circumstances is encountered 
(see latent fault 191-44-07). 
Note 2: A failure of an item is an event, as distinct from a fault of an item 
(191-44-01), which is a state. 
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Note 3: Qualifiers may be used to classify failures according to the severity 
of consequences, such as catastrophic, critical, major, minor, 
marginal and insignificant, the definitions depending upon the field 
of application. 
 
It results from these definitions and further analysis that the term “failure” 
will be understood as an event which leads straight to either a partial or 
complete loss of ability of an item to fulfill a required function. Most terms 
that are specified in the introduction dealing with the description of failure 
factors and profiles might also be found in a basic source document 
mentioned before. 
 
At present it just so happens that because of modification and updating of 
terminology, an existing view of understanding a failure and relating facts 
can be changed. Just to demonstrate the complexity of the present state we 
introduce the following facts. According to the notes of the term failure 
mentioned above, see IEC 60050 (191)/1990, an item after failure has a 
fault. (“An item after failure has a fault”.) Owing to continual discussions 
about this topic it is impossible to ignore the idea that a fault does not follow 
a failure but precedes it. This technical incompatibility together with many 
others has not been solved yet but their form has been very much discussed. 
A possible decision in favour of a new view will influence radically the 
existing approach, conception and observation of the failure. 
 
While working with the term failure, as well as with relating states, it is 
necessary to take the current terminology mismatch into account and to 
adapt possible decisions to it. The possibility of a realized change has to be 
accepted along with all the suffered consequences. Unfortunately, this 
change will violate the understanding of all existing terms/disciplines 
introduced so far that deal with a proper function/failure and dependability. 
 
3. What might the failure affect 
 
In this part it is necessary to draw attention to some relating events. We are 
dealing with a failure which prevents the items ability from performing a 
required function (either the main one, the minor one, or some other one as 
detailed below). It results from all the definitions in the paper that the 
inability of a system or a product to operate in a required way is a key term 
determining a failure. 
 
Based on many studies and approaches a factual scale of individual 
functions description in complex conception was formed for a system. On 
the basis of these assumptions it is also essential to distinguish the influence 
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of a failure on a function performed by an item. A failure occurrence might 
affect the range of the function. An outline of item functions is provided to 
make the understanding much easier, and failures occurrence is not strictly 
limited to a kind of an item function. 
 
A required function – specifies an item task. A correct, exact and 
unequivocal definition is a primary, starting point for all dependability 
definitions as well as for a right failure definition. Operation conditions – 
affect significantly both dependability and especially possible failure 
occurrence, hence why they have to be determined very thoroughly. 
 
1) Main function:  - an intended (required) or primary function 
2) Minor function:  - need for providing main function  
3) Supporting function: - the aim is to provide protection of people and 
an environment from potential damage 
regarding main or minor function failure as 
well as common support (brakes, circuit 
breakers, filters, etc.). 
4) Information function: - it provides conditions, monitoring, 
measuring, diagnostics, etc. (it refers to 
displays, indicators etc.). 
5) Interface function: - it provides an interface between an assessed 
item and other items (cabling, operating 
elements, switches, breakers, etc.). 
 
The required function and/or operation conditions might be time dependent. 
In this case a mission profile has to be determined and all dependability 
viewpoints have to be related to it. A representative mission profile and 
corresponding dependability targets have to be stated in the item’s 
specification. The mission duration is often/usually considered as a 
parameter t, that is time. The dependability function – especially the 
reliability function is designated as R(t). R(t) is the probability that no 
failure at item level will occur in the interval (0;t〉, often with the 
assumption R(0) = 1 – it means that at the time t = 0 the object was in the 
state of operation. In order to avoid confusion a distinction between 
predicted and estimated (assessed) dependability should be made on the 
basis of a real evaluation during operation or tests. The predicted 
dependability is calculated on the basis of the item’s dependability structure 
and the failure rate of its component. The estimated dependability is 
specified on the basis of a statistical evaluation of dependability tests or 
field data by known operating and environmental conditions.  
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Failure: - it occurs when an item terminates its ability to perform its required 
function. However simple the definition might look, it is difficult to apply it 
to complex items/systems. The basic operating time is generally a random 
variable. It is often reasonably long but on the other hand it might be very 
short, caused by systematic failure influence for example. It can also be 
caused by early failure influence resulting from a transient event at turn-on. 
A general presumption in investigating failure-free operating times is that at 
t = 0 which means that in an instant t = 0 the object is free of defects and 
systematic failures and therefore it is able to operate one hundred per cent. 
Besides their relative frequency, failures can be categorized according to 
one of the views mentioned before (mode, course, cause, consequences, 
mechanisms, etc.) [2, 3]. 
 
Failure profiles:  
- critical stage  - consequence seriousness 
     
- failure cause - misuse failure; 
   - mishandling failure; 
   - weakness failure; 
   - design failure; 
   - manufacturing failure; 
   - ageing/wearout failure; 
   - others (e.g. software). 
 
- failure mode (velocity) - sudden ; 
    - gradual  
- according to a range of a consequence - cataleptic; 
      - complete; 
      - partial. 
 
- according to a place of occurrence - during a test; 
      - during operation. 
 
- according to occurrence mechanism  - primary; 
      - secondary; 
      - systematic/reproducible; 
 
- according to verification possibility - verified failure; 
      - unverified failure. 
 
These are the very basic failures categories and factors they fall into, and 
this is the common way of how to work and deal with them. Moreover, we 
can determine some other (supplementary) failure categories but their 
degradation 
physical, chemical, or other 
processes leading to a 
failure 
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presence here is not possible due to space limits of the paper. The authors of 
the paper may provide more information for those who are interested. 
 
4. Failure occurrence cause 
 
According to the IEC 60050 (191) the circumstances occurring during 
design, manufacture or use which have resulted in a failure are the cause of 
a failure. To know the cause of a failure is useful in case we want to decide 
how to prevent a failure or its reoccurrence. Failure causes can be classified 
in relation to the life cycle of the system (see also figure 1 bellow) [3, 4].  
 
Cause – the cause of a failure can be intrinsic, due to weaknesses in the 
item and/or wearout, or extrinsic, due to errors, misuse or mishandling 
during the design, production and especially the use itself. Extrinsic causes 
often lead to systematic failures which are deterministic and might be 
considered like defects (dynamic defects in software quality). Defects are 
present at t=0, even if they cannot be discovered at t=0. Failures always 
seem to appear in time, even if the time to failure is very short as it can be 
with systematic or early failures. 
 
1) Design failure - occurs due to inadequate design. It is basically any 
failure directly related to item design. It means that 
due to item design a part of the whole degraded or got 
damaged and this resulted in a failure of the whole.  
 
2) Weakness failure - occurs due to weakness (internal) inherent or 
induced in the system so that the system cannot stand 
the stress it encounters in its normal environment.  
 
3) Manufacturing failure - a failure caused by nonconformity during 
manufacturing and processing. It is basically any 
failure caused by faulty processing, or inadequate 
manufacturing, or an error made while controlling the 
process during manufacturing, tests and repairs. 
 
4) Ageing failure - a failure caused by the effects of usage and/or age. 
 
5) Misuse failure - a failure caused by misuse of the system (operating 
in environments for which it was not designed). 
 
6) Mishandling failure - a failure caused by incorrect handling and/or lack 
of care and maintenance. 
 
7) Software error failure - a failure caused by a PC programme error. 
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5. Failure mechanism 
 
The failure mechanism is a very complex and extensive passage of the 
failure profile. It can be sudden or gradual with its relating manifestations. 
Failure mechanism - physical, chemical, electrical, thermal or other 
process that results in failure. 
 
Mode (manifestation, course) – the mode of a failure is a symptom (local 
effect) by which a failure is observed. For 
example – opens, shorts, or drifts (for 
electronic components). Brittle rupture, 
creep, cracking, seizure, or fatigue (for 
mechanical components), etc.  
 
The connections related to these aspects of a failure are shown in the 
following description: 
 
1. Intermitted (incoherent) failure - a failure which lasts only for a short 
time. A good example of this is a fault that 
occurs only under certain conditions 
occurring intermittently (irregularly). 
 
2. Extended failure  - failures that occur until some corrective 
action rectifies the failure. They can be 
divided into the following two categories: 
 
a) Sudden failure      - a failure which occurs without warning  
b) Gradual failure  - a failure which occurs with signals to warn 
of the occurrence. Usually it is a case of 
significant behavior changes (decreasing 
performance, increasing temperature, rising 
vibrations, etc.). 
 
We have to distinguish among different failure mechanisms of mechanical, 
electrical and hydraulic parts. The differentiation is so complex that it can 
not be easily presented in this paper. 
 
6. Failure consequences 
 
Many information sources use the term failure consequence. Also many 
standards define them and work with them differently. The following part 
should help to clarify the concept of failure consequences, as we also know 
them from many reliability analyses. 
 
Effect - the effect (consequence) of a failure can be different if considered 
on the item itself or at a higher level. A usual classification of a 
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failure has usually the following qualitative profile and is: non-
relevant, partial, complete, …, critical failure. Since a failure can 
also cause further failures in an item or a system, a distinction 
between primary and secondary failure is important.  
 
A classification of the severity of a failure mode in accordance with 
the MIL-STD 882 is listed:  
1) Catastrophic failure - a failure that can lead to death or can cause total 
system (item) loss. 
2) Critical failure - a failure which results in many serious injuries or 
major system damage. Sometimes we think of it as a 
failure, or combination of failures, that prevents an 
item from performing a required mission. 
3) Marginal failure - a failure that leads to minor injury or minor system 
damage. 
4) Negligible failure - a failure that leads to less than minor injury of 
system damage. 
 
Another classification can be found in the RCM approach where the 
following classes are used: 
Failures with safety consequences; 
Failures with environmental consequences; 
Failures with operational consequences; 
Failures with non-operational consequences. 
 
A classification of the failure severity into groups (categories) is given in 
more standards. Each of them is specific in a way and corresponds with a 
presupposed application. The IEC 61882, IEC 60812, IEC 50 126 and many 
others are some of the examples. We do not have the ambition to make a 
complete list of failure consequences and their classification. 
 
7. Sources of failure profile determination 
 
We do not want to speak about basic and clear failure measures and 
characteristics which are obviously well known in our community. Our 
attempt is to present different sources of failure data/measures/characteristic 
obtaining. The main sources are: 
 
1) Data on elements’ reliability guaranteed by a producer – there is no need 
to expand on it; 
 
2) Conclusive test results (observation) of the same (comparable) item 
reliability. It is based on the standardized assessment of reliability tests of 
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technical items. The methods and methodologies of how to conduct tests 
are standardized for different equipment. 
 
3) Predictions – standardised calculation of item’s reliability based on a 
reliable source (MIL HDBK 217F). This is the American military 
standard that enables the data on electronic elements’ reliability to be 
estimated. It is commonly used when estimating the elements’ failure rate 
especially in military applications. 
 
4) Specialized information databases on elements’ reliability (specialized in 
terms of elements’ profile or conditions of usage). Specialized 
information databases on elements’ reliability are usually established and 
kept to meet the needs of single industrial branches or technical areas. 
The data acquired when observing items in operation or the results of 
specialized dependability tests are collected in the databases. One of the 
most respectable and frequently used databases on reliability in this area 
is the database established and kept by the Reliability analyses centre 
(RAC) which at present distributes three important databases on the 
commercial basis: EPRD-97; NPRD-95; FMD-97; SPIDR 2007 [5, 6, 7, 
8]. 
 
5) General information database on elements’ reliability. These databases 
are usually published as parts of specialized literature in the 
dependability area. The information put in them is usually very general. 
 
6) Expert estimations. Expert estimations of numerical values of reliability 
measures might be used only when appropriate values cannot be 
specified by a different, more reliable method. The authors of the article 
know from experience that this solution is accepted only as an exception 
because in most cases the numerical values of reliability measures can be 
determined by other methods described in this paper. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This contribution is supposed to give a general overview in the area of the 
basic term “a failure” as described above. As the understanding of all related 
matters is very complex it is not possible to express complete knowledge 
and experience here. Some reliability and safety engineers might be 
confused while beginning with a specific analysis (e.g. FMECA, PHA, JSA, 
OSHA, etc.). The main benefit of this contribution is supposed to be a 
general and introductive material for understanding a failure, its full profile 
with all related characteristics. The next purpose of the paper is to provide a 
hand (possibly guide lines) to orient the analyst on the appropriate 
information sources which are necessary for the analysis.  Due to the limited 
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space within the paper, the information provided is not complete (more an 
overview), therefore those who are interested we kindly ask to contact the 
authors. 
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